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LOCALISM and REGIONALISM
Richard Briffault
August 11, 1999

Localism and regionalism are normally seen as contrasting, indeed conflicting, conceptions
of metropolitan area governance. Localism in this context refers to the view that the existing system
of a large number of relatively small governments wielding power over such critical matters as local
land use regulation, local taxation, and the financing of local public services ought to be preserved.
The meaning of regionalism is less clearly defined and proposals for regional governance vary widely,
but most advocates of regionalism would shift some authority from local governments, restrict local
autonomy, or, at the very least, constrain the ability of local governments to pursue local interests.
Regionalism would move some power to institutions, organizations or procedures with a larger
territorial scope and more population than existing local governments. Regionalism appears to be a
step towards centralization. As such, it seems to be the antithesis of the decentralization represented
by localism.
Yet, in the metropolitan areas that dominate America at the end of the twentieth century,
regionalism is not simply the enemy of localism: It is also localism’s logical extension. Localism is
about the legal and political empowerment of local areas. The theoretical case for localism rests on
a set of arguments about the role of local governments in promoting governmental efficiency,
democracy, and community. But in contemporary metropolitan areas, the economically, socially, and
ecologically relevant local area is often the region. Consequently, in metropolitan areas, concerns
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about efficiency, democracy, and community ought to lead to support for some shift in power away
from existing localities to new processes, structures, or organizations that can promote decisionmaking on behalf of the interests of a region considered as a whole. Regionalism is, thus, localism
for metropolitan areas.
Of course, the congruence of the theoretical underpinnings of localism and regionalism does
not dispel the real world conflict between localism and regionalism. Localists do not become
regionalists simply because they live in metropolitan regions. Indeed, the resistance to regionalism
is quite widespread in most metropolitan areas. Localism is not simply a theory of government
intended to advance certain normative goals. It is also a means of protecting the interests of those
who receive advantages from the existing governance structure, including, but not limited to, local
government officials, businesses that reap the rewards of the interlocal competition for commercial
and industrial activity, real estate interests that profit from the system’s propensity to promote the
development of new land, and residents of more affluent areas who enjoy the benefits of an ample
local tax base. The relationship between localism and regionalism, and the intense localist resistance
to regionalism, tells us as much about the role of local self-interest in promoting localism in practice
– and, for that matter, in promoting regionalism – as about the connection between localist values and
regionalism in theory.
This essay explores the relationship between localism and regionalism. Part I examines the
“what” and the “why” of contemporary regionalism: What does regionalism mean and why has
regionalism enjoyed so much attention from academics, urbanists and policy analysts in recent years?
Part II reviews the arguments for localism, and explains how, despite the asserted conflict between
localism and regionalism, the theories underlying localism actually make a case for regionalism in
2

contemporary metropolitan areas. Finally, Part III considers the prospects in practice for moving from
localism to regionalism.

I. Regionalism: The What and the Why?
A. What is Regionalism?
In contemporary discussions, regionalism has three elements. First, and most important, is the
idea that a region is a real economic, social, and ecological unit. A metropolitan area1 is a real unit
in the sense that the people who live there do not concentrate their daily lives within any one locality
but, rather, regularly move back and forth among multiple municipalities across a region. A person
may live in one locality, work in another, shop in a third, seek entertainment or engage in a cultural
activity in a fourth, and move through a large number of other localities during the course of his or
her daily rounds.2 Regions, not the cities within them, function as labor markets and housing markets,3
and businesses look to the region, rather than to the localities in which they are located, for their
suppliers, their workers, and their customers. Cultural and educational institutions, like museums,
orchestras, and universities, serve broader regions rather than just their home cities. Environmental

1

The Census Bureau defines a metropolitan area as a “geographic area consisting of a
large population nucleus together with adjacent communities which have a high degree of
economic and social integration with that nucleus.” BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK 1991, at 353 (1991).
2

See Charles Abbott, THE NEW URBAN AMERICA: GROWTH AND POLITICS IN SUNBELT
CITIES 186 (rev. ed. 1987) (quoting the statement of a Southern California woman: “‘I live in
Garden Grove, work in Irvine, shop in Santa Ana, go to the dentist in Anaheim . . . and used to be
president of the League of Women Voters in Fullerton.’”)
3

See, e.g., William N. Goetzmann, Matthew Spiegel & Susan M. Wachter, Do Cities and
Suburbs Cluster?, 3 CITYSCAPE: A JOURNAL OF POLICY DEVEL. & RESEARCH 193 (1998).
3

and natural resource questions – like air and water quality, water supply, waste disposal, or the
availability of open space – affect regions that transcend local boundaries. If we think of a city or a
locality as a group of people, living near each other, who have common place-based interests,
relatively high levels of interaction with each other, and much less intense interactions with residents
of other cities, then in the words of David Rusk, “[t]he real city is the total metropolitan area.”4
The metropolitan area is the dominant form of population settlement in America at the end
of the twentieth century. In 1990, 193 million people, or 78 percent of the total population of the
United States, lived in metropolitan areas.5 The 21 most populous metropolitan areas (those with two
million people or more) included 101 million people, or forty percent of the population. Slightly more
than half of all Americans in 1990 lived in the 39 metropolitan areas that contained one million people
or more.6
The metropolitan region falls between city and state.

Composed of multiple local

governments, it is usually far larger in area and population than any of the local governments,
particularly the municipalities, that lie within it.7 Yet, the metropolitan region typically accounts for

4

David Rusk, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 3 (2d ed. 1995). Accord, Neal Peirce,
Regionalism and Technology , 85 NAT. CIV. REV. (No. 2, Spring-Summer 1996) at 59, 59
(“metropolitan regions - ‘citistates’ are the true cities of our time”).
5

See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra, at 205.

6

See Eli Ginzberg, The Changing Urban Scene: 1960-1990 and Beyond, in INTERWOVEN
DESTINIES: CITIES AND THE NATION 33, 35-36 (Henry G. Cisneros ed., 1993) (hereinafter
“INTERWOVEN DESTINES”).
7

According to Rusk, out of 320 metropolitan areas, there were only 48 areas, accounting
for about 8 million people, in which there was one local government that encompassed at least
sixty percent of the metropolitan population. In only, one metropolitan area was there a local
government that served the entire population. See Rusk, supra, at 90, 99.
4

only a fraction of the population and land area in a state.8
Metropolitan regions usually lack formal legal or political existence. They are generally not
chartered, incorporated, or granted home rule.9 Not one major metropolitan area is governed by a
single all-encompassing general purpose government. In most metropolitan areas there is no legal or
political institution capable of developing and implementing regional policies across a wide range of
matters of regional concerns. In many areas, there are special purpose bodies capable of raising funds
or delivering services across a region. But as former U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development Henry G. Cisneros once put it, these entities constitute a kind of “things-regionalism”
aimed at financing, constructing or operating infrastructure facilities, such as highways, mass transit,
ports and airports, water supply, and wastewater treatment.10 Their focus on “system-maintenance
functions”11 tends to lead them to frame their missions around engineering or technical questions,
rather than the broader economic and social issues implicated by the location and operation of new
facilities. Their single-purpose specialization “constrains opportunities for comprehensive regional

8

Many metropolitan areas are not nested neatly within a single state but, instead, sprawl
across state lines. In 1990, 10 of the 30 most populous metropolitan areas, and five of the ten
largest, crossed state lines. See Henry G. Cisneros, Interwoven Destinies: Cities and the Nation,
in DESTINIES, supra, at 17, tbl 2.
9

An important exception is the region around Portland, Oregon. The Portland
Metropolitan Service District received a home rule charter in 1992. The District, however, is not
a full-fledged general purpose government. See Rusk, supra, at 108.
10

See Henry G. Cisneros, Regionalism: The New Geography of Opportunity, 85 NAT.
CIV. REV. 35, 37-38 (1996).
11

See Oliver Williams, Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 SW. SOC. SCI. Q. 299, 304-07 (1967).
5

policy discussions and tradeoffs.”12 These entities provide important services, but they generally do
not provide an opportunity to integrate a range of public concerns, for example, to connect the
location of new roads or sewer lines with issues like the location and affordability of housing.
The sense that legal and political institutions have failed to keep up with the economic, social,
and ecological existence of regions drives the second and third components of regionalism -- the call
for regional policies that reflect regionwide concerns, and the interest in creating new region-level
mechanisms that can take a regionwide perspective with respect to issues that affect the region.
The second component -- the desire for regional instead of purely local policies -- is reflected
in the many proposals concerning land use planning, economic development, affordable housing, the
financing of public services, and the protection of the regional environment. Many of these proposals
would leave local powers and structures in place, but, through a combination of incentives or
requirements that local actions conform to regional standards, would superimpose on local decisionmaking regional goals or norms concerning such matters as the management of new growth, the
allocation of affordable housing, or the sharing of the local revenue gains from new property tax base
growth.
The third component of regionalism is the interest in creating new mechanisms that would
be able to articulate regional concerns and formulate and implement regional policies. Regional
policy-making does not necessarily require regional institutions. Policy proposals can come from
existing localities, from private groups or individuals operating within existing localities, or from
loose collections of different groups from different localities. Growth management or tax base sharing

12

Scott A. Bollens, Fragments of Regionalism: The Limits of Southern California
Governance, 19 J. URB. AFF. 105, 118 (1997).
6

can be implemented by the state, without the creation of new regional bodies. Many proponents of
regional policies and of the need for a new, more regional focus to local policymaking, are wary of
placing proposals for regional governance structures on their reform agendas. The long and largely
unsuccessful history of efforts to create metropolitan governments,13 has persuaded some regionalists
that governance reform is doomed to failure.14 Yet, while much of contemporary regionalism is
focused on policy, the governance concern is a persistent thread in regionalist proposals. Proposals
for full-fledged regional governments are rare,15 but regionalists regularly call for new regional
processes, structures, or institutions that can identify regional problems, formulate regional solutions,
implement those solutions, and coordinate regional actions over a wide range of policy domains.16

13

See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1117-1120 (1996).
14

See, e.g., William Dodge, Regional Excellence, 85 NAT. CIV. REV. 4, 5 (1996); David
Rusk, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA 8-11
(1999) (given unlikelihood in most regions of a regional government, focus instead on regional
land use planning, fair share housing, and revenue sharing); Todd Swanstrom, Ideas Matter:
Reflections on the New Regionalism, 2 CITYSCAPE: A JOURNAL OF POLICY DEVEL. & RESEARCH
5, 15 (“Clearly, the age of general-purpose regional governments is past.”)
15

David Rusk’s earlier book, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS, was such a call. Rusk urged the
consolidation of existing metropolitan area local governments, or annexation by the central city in
the region, as the best way of achieving his metropolitan policy goals of reducing racial
segregation, remedying interlocal fiscal imbalance, promoting regional economic development,
and implementing regional growth management: “Having a metropolitan government is much
better than trying to get multiple local governments to act like a metropolitan government. The
former is a more lasting and stable framework for sustained, long-term action.” CITIES WITHOUT
SUBURBS, supra, at 85.
16

See, e.g., Myron Orfield, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY 99-103 (1997); Allan D. Wallis, Regions in Action: Crafting Regional Governance
Under the Challenge of Global Competitiveness, 85 NAT. CIV. REV. 15, 18 (No. 2, SpringSummer1996).
7

These proposals range from reliance on coalitions of business leaders17 or on cross-sectoral alliances
of public-private and public-private-nonprofit organizations;18 to the use of regional councils of local
governments19 or regional coordinating councils that would have power to provide funds for local
development projects that are consistent with regional policies;20 to the creation of an elected
metropolitan council with powers to make land use and development policies for the region.21
Although regional institutions will not necessarily be effective advocates of the regional perspective,22
regions will require some mechanisms for considering regional issues, debating regional problems,
and articulating regional views if regional policies are to be representative of and responsive to the
concerns of regional residents.
B. Why Regionalism?
After a long period in which regionalism seemed dead, there has been a striking upsurge of

17

See. e.g., Wallis, supra, at 19-21.

18

Id. at 21-22.

19

See, e.g., J. Eugene Grigsby III, Regional Governance and Regional Councils, 85 NAT.
CIV. REV. 53 (No. 2, Spring-Summer1996).
20

Elmer W. Johnson, CHICAGO METROPOLIS 2020: PREPARING METROPOLITAN CHICAGO
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95-101 (1999) (proposal for Chicago area Regional Coordinating Council;
cf. Rusk, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra, at 201-221 (discussion of Dayton area program
involving the use of a regional advisory committee to allocate funds for economic development
projects in the region).
21

See, Orfield, supra.

22

See id. at 123-24, 178-80 (reviewing the mixed record of the Twin Cities Metropolitan
Council); cf. Kathryn A. Foster, Regional Capital, paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association at 17 (existence of regional institutions such as
special districts not a good predictor of regional policy outcomes).
8

interest in regionalism in the 1990s.23 The current attention to regionalism has three strands: a
concern about sprawl, a recognition of the concentration of poverty within metropolitan areas, and
a belief that regions will be hampered in their ability to engage in economic competition unless they
address their internal economic and social inequities.
First, there is the growing dissatisfaction with the dominant pattern of metropolitan area land
use: sprawling low-density development. In nearly all metropolitan areas, the growth in the amount
of urbanized land has wildly outpaced the growth in population.24 Over the last quarter-century, the
population of the New York metropolitan area grew 5 percent, but the developed land in the region
increased by 61%;25 similarly, in the 1970s, metropolitan Chicago’s population grew just 4 percent,
while its urbanized territory expanded 46%.26 The extension of metropolitan areas consumes open
space and degrades environmentally sensitive areas, displacing land uses that contribute to the
regional quality of life. Spreading metropolitan areas create a demand for expensive new
infrastructure – highways and streets, sewage treatment facilities, fire stations, schools – in growing
communities on the urban fringe.27 Sprawl contributes to the dispersed pattern of regional

23

See, e.g., Bruce Katz & Scott Bernstein, The New Metropolitan Agenda: Connecting
Cities and Suburbs, 16 BROOKINGS REV. (No. 4, Fall 1998) at 4, 5; Janis Purdy, Introduction, 85
Nat. Civ. Rev. 3 (No. 2, Spring-Summer 1996) (“regionalism is a hot issue in the 1990s”); Allan
D. Wallis, Filling the Governance Gap, http://www.citistates.com/Wallis.htm (reviewing recent
books by “the new regionalists”).
24

See, e.g., Rusk, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra, at 66-69.

25

See Neal R. Peirce, CITISTATES: HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A
COMPETITIVE WORLD 28 (1993).
26

Id.

27

See id. at 132 (noting the “immense public cost” of duplicative infrastructures on the
metropolitan fringe
9

development that effectively precludes the use of mass transit,28 and leads to the loss of many of the
social, cultural, and civic benefits that could occur if it were easier for people to come together at
central points in to discuss matters of community concern.
The existing local governance system contributes to sprawl. Local governments are largely
dependent on the taxation of property within local borders for their revenues, much as they are largely
dependent on local revenues to fund local services. As a matter of local fiscal policy, each locality has
an economic interest in using its planning and zoning powers to exclude new residents and activities
that cost more in services than they contribute to the tax base. Local land use regulations can be used
to drive up the cost of housing in a locality, thereby creating a de facto price of entry that serves to
exclude potential residents who would not add to the net per capita wealth of the community.29 Local
decisions to restrict or exclude particular land uses – like apartment houses, townhouses, or even
smaller detached houses – or to drive up the cost of land, as by making large lots a precondition for
building – will displace less affluent people to other localities.30 Although an individual locality is
unlikely to be able to affect the regional housing market, local land use controls can have a ripple
effect across the region. When one locality acts to exclude lower-cost housing, its neighbors may feel
compelled to adopt comparable regulations to protect themselves from the growth they fear will be
diverted to them by the initial locality’s regulation. As a result, exclusionary zoning can spread

28

See, e.g., Anthony Downs, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 8 (1994);
Elliott D. Sclar & Walter Hook, The Importance of Cities to the National Economy, in
INTERWOVEN DESTINIES, supra, at 48, 57.
29

They can also use targeted tax cuts, service provision, eminent domain, or land use
regulations to attract firms and residents that add to the local tax base.
30

See, e.g., Orfield, supra, at 58-62 (reviewing locally created barriers to affordable

housing).
10

throughout a metropolitan area, driving up the cost of housing and denying less affluent people the
opportunity to live in large numbers of communities within the region.
Exclusionary zoning forces new development away from existing partially developed
communities to the exurban and rural communities at the perimeter of the region.31 This leapfrog
pattern of development, in which households that cannot afford housing in closer-in communities
because of local fiscal zoning move to less restrictive outlying areas, creates sprawl. To be sure, local
land use regulation is not the sole, or even the prime, cause of sprawl. New developments in
transportation and improved communications technologies have reduced the benefits of central
location, while the increased role of information rather than physical inputs in production has
loosened the ties of particular firms to particular places, freeing them to relocate to cheaper locations
on the metropolitan periphery. Federal subsidies for highways and new suburban infrastructure,32 the
failure to price the true costs of driving,33 and federal tax benefits and mortgage guarantees favoring
new single-family homes34 have all promoted the movement of people and firms away from older
cities and suburbs.35 Nevertheless, the decentralized and fragmented local government system – which

31

See, e.g., Lawrence Katz & Kenneth T. Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects of
Growth Controls on Housing, 30 J.L. & ECON. 149 (1987).
32

See, e.g., Rusk, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra, at 91-92.

33

Se, e.g., Pietro S. Nivola, LAWS OF THE LANDSCAPE: HOW POLICIES SHAPE CITIES IN
EUROPE AND AMERICA 67-68, 83-84 (1999).
34

See, e.g., Rusk, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra, at 86-90.

35

There are also undeniable benefits from sprawl for many metropolitan area residents.
“Those benefits include low density residential life-styles, relatively easy access to open space
both at one’s own home and in the countryside, a broad choice of places to work and live,
relatively short commuting times for most of those who live and work in the suburbs, ease of
movement except in peak periods, the ability of middle- and upper-income households to separate
11

encourages individual localities to use land use policy to pursue local fiscal goals – has had an
impact.36 More importantly, the local government system makes it difficult for individual localities
to take action to control sprawl. Sprawl is a regional phenomenon: “Therefore, purely local growth
management policies cannot succeed without some strong regionwide mechanism for coordinating
them.”37
The second cause of the current interest in regionalism is the growing concentration of
poverty, especially of poverty among African-Americans and Hispanics, in metropolitan areas.38
Although metropolitan area incomes are up, and racial housing segregation has modestly declined,39
poor people, particularly poor people of color, are increasingly concentrated in a relatively small
number of high-poverty census tracts. These neighborhoods, marked by physical decay and by higher
crime, delinquency, drug addiction, and unemployment rates than the rest of the metropolitan area,
are in “extreme economic and social crisis.”40
This concentration of poverty is intertwined with municipal fiscal distress. High-poverty areas

themselves spatially from problems associated with poverty, and their ability to exercise strong
influence on their local governments.” Anthony Downs, How America’s Cities Are Growing: The
Big Picture, 17 BROOKINGS REV (No. 4, Fall 1998) at 8,9. See also Alan A. Altshuler, The Ideologics of Urban Land Use Policy, in Martha Derthick, ed., DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S
FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 189, 193 (1999) (suggesting that sprawl is popular with many
metropolitan area residents).
36

Robert Fishman, Megalopolis Unbound, WILSON Q., Winter 1990, at 25, 36.

37

Downs, How America’s Cities Are Growing, supra, at 9.

38

See, e.g., Orfield, METROPOLITICS, supra, at 15-45, 156-67; Rusk, INSIDE
GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra, 71-81, 123-25.
39

See Rusk, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra, at 72-74.

40

Id. at 79.
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require far more municipal services than other areas do, yet their poverty means that they lack the tax
base to fund these services. Taxpayers in localities with high concentrations of the poor are likely to
be subject to higher local tax rates, but to receive lower quality basic services. The combination of
social and economic distress with high tax rates and low service quality leads businesses and middleincome households to move to other areas, “tak[ing] their fiscal resources with them.”41 This
increases the concentration of poverty within the areas they leave, while further reducing the
resources in those areas for financing local public services. As a result, “a self-aggravating downward
fiscal spiral weakens the ability of core-area governments to provide quality public services and
results in grossly unequal environments across our metropolitan areas.”42 Although associated with
central cities, high poverty districts are not confined to those cities. In most metropolitan areas there
are older, inner suburbs whose concentrations of poverty, crime, and fiscal distress exceed those of
the central city.
Sprawl and the concentration of poverty are connected. Concentrated poverty operates as a
“push” factor, causing those who can leave high poverty areas to do so. Their efforts to move their
businesses and find new housing in developing areas contributes to sprawl. Conversely, the
availability of commercial and residential sites elsewhere in the metropolitan area -- and the ability
to obtain better services and avoid the higher tax rates of the poorer localities by moving to new
locations -- operates as a “pull” factor inducing people to move. This movement, by reducing the
middle class population in poorer areas, making many new jobs less accessible to poverty-area

41

Downs, supra, at 10.

42

Id.
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residents,43 and weakening the local tax base in those areas, deepens the impoverishment of poorer
localities.
Again, the concentration of poverty in a relatively small number of metropolitan area census
tracts is not a product solely of the local government system. Much broader economic and social
factors are at work, and a range of federal policies are implicated.44 But the local government system
contributes to the problem. By linking both the tax rate and the funds available for local public
services to the local tax base, the local government system means that those with the greatest need
for services such as education are likely to receive the worst services, while those taxpayers in poor
areas will have the greatest incentive to leave those areas and, thus, contribute to the concentration
of poverty and to the physical and social isolation of poverty district residents from other people.
Local fiscal autonomy also propels local land use policies, thereby contributing to local exclusionary
regulation. As with sprawl, the consequences of the concentration of poverty for local taxes and
services cannot be addressed successfully at the local level alone.45
The third, and perhaps the most intriguing, strand in contemporary regionalism is the belief
that a more regionalist approach is required by the new global economy.46 This argument from

43

See, e.g., Orfield, supra, at 66-68 (reviewing the “spatial mismatch” of new jobs created
in the outer suburbs and low-income workers in the central city and inner suburbs).
44

See, e.g., Rusk, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra, at 107-121,

45

See id. at 126-151; Orfield, supra, at 74; Helen F. Ladd & John Yinger, AMERICA’S
AILING CITIES: FISCAL HEALTH AND THE DESIGN OF URBAN POLICY (1989).
46

See, e.g. Peirce, supra; Theodore Hershberg, Regional Cooperation: Strategies and
Incentives for Global Competitiveness and Urban Reform, 85 NAT. CIV. REV. 25 (No. 2, SpringSummer1996). See also Kathryn A. Foster, Regional Impulses, 19 J. URB. AFF. 375, 375 (1997)
(noting the “pressure of global competitiveness and regional excellence” in the “rediscover[y]” of
regionalism).
14

competitiveness asserts that in today’s economy metropolitan regions are “the units of economic
competition,”47 and that in order to compete effectively metropolitan areas have to deal with the
social and economic problems of their poorer areas. The argument relies on studies that demonstrate
that metropolitan areas function as interdependent economic regions in which there are close
relationships between the central city and the surrounding area.48
These studies find that as interlocal disparities in household income rise, the overall economic
health of the metropolitan region declines.49 A study of metropolitan areas by the National League
of Cities found that city-suburb disparities in per capita income were negatively correlated with
regionwide employment growth, that is, those areas in which income disparities were narrowest were
marked by the greatest overall regional growth, whereas those areas with above-average income
inequality had lower employment growth or even declines in employment rates.50 A second National
League of Cities study found a correlation between suburban income growth and city income growth.
Although city income growth generally lagged suburban growth, cities and suburbs tended to move

47

Hershberg, supra, at 25.

48

See, e.g., H.V. Savitch, David Collins, Daniel Sanders & John P, Markham, Ties That
Bind: Central Cities, Suburbs, and the New Metropolitan Region, 7 ECON. DEV. Q. 341, 342
(1993).
49

See, e.g., H.V. Savitch, Daniel Sanders & David Collins, The Regional City and Public
Partnerships, in IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE 1990 URBAN SUMMIT: WITH RELATED
ANALYSES, TRANSCRIPT, AND PAPERS 65, 67-69 (Ronald Berkman, Joyce F. Brown, Beverly
Goldberg & Tod Mijanovich eds. 1992).
50

Larry C. Ledebur & William R. Barnes, National League of Cities, CITY DISTRESS,
METROPOLITAN DISPARITIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 14-16 (1992).
15

in the same direction, and suburbs did best when their cities did best.51 Another study, of metropolitan
areas in the northeast and north central regions, found that “it is unlikely that a metropolitan area’s
suburban economic performance, as measured by income growth, is strong relative to other suburban
areas if the metropolitan area has declining central city incomes.”52
The “high correlation between city and suburban growth, income, and population”53 suggests
that the metropolitan area is “an economically and socially integrated urban entity”54 whose various
component local parts tend to rise and fall together. The economically intertwined nature of localities
within a metropolitan area may not be simply a matter of cities and suburbs. In most metropolitan
areas, most of the people and many of the jobs are located outside the central city, scattered in
localities throughout the region. Firms draw their workers from multiple urban and suburban settings.
They depend on localities other than the ones in which the firms are located to educate the next
generation of workers and to provide basic public services and amenities to workers and their
families. To the extent that the more fiscally straitened localities of residence are unable to provide
proper education, policing, sanitation, and parks to their residents, firms – and the regional economy
as a whole -- will bear part of the cost. If the fate of the more affluent areas within a region is tied to
the well-being of its poorer areas, then the region as a whole may have an interest in addressing the

51

Larry C. Ledebur & William R. Barnes, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, “ALL IN IT
TOGETHER”: CITIES, SUBURBS, AND LOCAL ECONOMIC REGIONS 1 (1993).
52

Richard Voith, City and Suburban Growth: Substitutes or Complements?, FED.
RESERVE BANK PHILA.. BUS. REV. Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 21, 29.
53

Id. at 27.

54

Peter D. Salins, Metropolitan Areas: Cities, Suburbs, and the Ties that Bind, in
INTERWOVEN DESTINIES, supra., at 147, 149.
16

problems of its more impoverished communities.
The competitiveness argument for regionalism is controversial. Although there is evidence
that rates of regional growth are inversely correlated with the severity of intraregional disparities,
correlation is not causation. Instead of equality facilitating growth, growth may promote equality.
High-growth regions may be more internally equal because of the trickle-down effects of growth.
Low-growth regions may be more internally unequal not because inequality hampers growth but
because lack of growth contributes to inequality.55 Nor is it clear that the connection between regional
growth and intraregional equality is a constant across the country. One study found that the
relationship was particularly significant only in the northeast and was much weaker elsewhere.56
Nevertheless, the argument from competitiveness is a significant one in contemporary
regionalism. It explains much of the support for regionalism among business groups.57 It gives
greater weight to the ties that link up the different localities within a region rather than to the forces
that drive them apart. And, consistent with the role of local self-interest in reinforcing localism, it tries
to make a case for regionalism in terms of the self-interest, albeit the enlightened self-interest, of even
the residents of the high tax-base, low-density suburbs that appear to benefit most from the current
localist system.

II. From Localism to Regionalism
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A. The Case for Localism
Advocates of the decentralization of power to local governments argue that it promotes
allocational efficiency in the provision of public services, democratic citizenship, and selfdetermination by territorial communities.
1. Efficiency
Building on the work of Charles Tiebout,58 and effectively presented by Alex Anas in his
contribution to this Symposium,59 an important argument for local autonomy is that it promotes the
efficient provision of public goods and services. This occurs in three ways. First, local autonomy
permits public policy decisions to match distinctive local conditions. If all political decisions were
taken at a highly centralized level, it would be difficult to vary policies in light of diverse local needs
and preferences. Centrally determined policies might leave large numbers of people subject to
government decisions they oppose. Decentralization allows local governments to tailor services,
regulation and taxation to the needs and desires of their particular constituents.60
Second, in Tiebout’s model, if there is a large number of localities in a given area, and if
people are free to relocate from one locality to another, individuals will be able to select among
different localities, each offering its particular package of taxes, services, and regulation. A
multiplicity of relatively autonomous localities permits a range of choices and increases the ease of
movement among them, enhancing the likelihood that one locality will approximate the mobile
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“consumer-voter’s” preferences.61 People can sort themselves out by moving, with those having
similar preferences for local public goods, services, and taxes settling in the same localities and apart
from people with different preferences. Thus, not only can local governments vary their policies in
light of local preferences or conditions, but households can choose among local governments and
move to, or remain in, the locality that offers the package of government activities that best matches
their preferences.
Third, the existence of a large number of localities, and the opportunity for exit, gives citizens
greater control over their local governments. If local decisions are inconsistent with a resident’s
preference, she is not stuck with that outcome. Instead, she can exit to an adjacent locality. Indeed,
the mere possibility of exit and the local government’s awareness that local residents can vote with
their feet operates to constrain local government actions. The possibility of taxpayer exit and,
conversely, the possibility of drawing in new taxpayers from other localities, means that local
governments will compete for taxpayers, much as firms compete for customers. The resulting
interlocal competition checks local taxing, spending, and administrative inefficiency.
2. Democracy
The second major argument for local autonomy is democracy. A healthy democracy requires
that its citizens have opportunities to participate in the political process. Local government provides
citizens with opportunities for participation in public decision-making that are simply unavailable in
larger units of government. Democratic participation is presumably more possible at the local level,
where government bodies and public officials are more accessible and closer to home than at the state
or national level. The costs of participation in terms of the time, energy, and money needed to reach
61
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out, engage, and persuade other members of the polity are likely to be lower in smaller, local units
than in larger ones.62 Participation may also be more satisfying at the local level. Where the unit is
small, each individual can be heard by and potentially influence a significant portion of the polity.
There is a greater chance that his or her “action will make a significant difference in the outcome,”
that is, that he or she will be effective in determining local policy, winning local office, or least
shaping the local debate.63
Local democracy is connected to local autonomy. People will bother to participate in local
government decision-making only if local governments have real power over matters important to
local people.64 Local political participation, thus, requires local autonomy, much as local autonomy
advances the prospects for local democracy.
3. Community
A third strand in the argument for local autonomy is the belief that localities are not simply
arbitrary collections of small groups of people who happen to buy public services or engage in public
decision-making together but are, instead, communities – groups of people with shared concerns and
values, distinct from those of the surrounding world and tied up with the history and circumstances
of the particular places in which they are located. People live in localities, raise their children there,
and share many interests related to their homes, families, and immediate neighborhoods. Much of the
power of the idea of local autonomy in our legal and political culture grows out of this connection
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of government with place-based association.65
This is not simply a matter of the efficiency advantages of making decisions concerning public
goods or services at the local level, or of the democratic possibilities of allowing people to engage
in collective political action at the grass-roots. Rather, the argument from community assumes that
a locality is a place with a particular history, identifiable characteristics, and a unique identity. If a
society values its distinctive communities, local autonomy is important because it allows local
communities to govern themselves.
B. Localism in the Metropolitan Region
Each of the arguments for localism is seriously undermined by the regionalization of the
conditions for and the consequences of local government actions in contemporary metropolitan areas.
Rather, in the metropolitan context, the arguments for localism actually begin to make the case for
some kind of region-level policy-making and governance.
1. Efficiency
Underlying the efficiency case for local autonomy is the assumption that the costs of local
actions are borne primarily by the acting locality, that is, they are internalized. Tiebout makes this
premise express: In his model, local government will be efficient only when locally supplied public
services “exhibit no external economies or diseconomies between communities.”66 In metropolitan
areas, however, local actions are frequently marked by externalities.
Local borders probably always generated some spillovers, but in the past, when local
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governments were set farther apart by unincorporated land, and people focused more of their
activities within the territorial limits of their particular locality, the spillovers may have been relatively
slight compared to the efficiency benefits of decentralized decision-making. The spillover problem
is more acute in contemporary metropolitan areas, where local borders frequently abut each other,
and people range widely in their daily activities across multiple local boundaries. In metropolitan
regions, local governments are sure to generate externalities. As the example of sprawl indicates,
these may not involve simply the impact of one particular locality on its neighbor, but may instead be
the consequence of the aggregate of local policies across the region. Local land use decisions have
regional effects, yet “in arriving at its decisions, the typical locality ignores regional impacts.”67
The efficiency model relies heavily on interlocal mobility in order to work.68 It is interlocal
mobility that enables people to select the community that best matches their needs, and it is the
possibility of mobility that gives rise to the interlocal competition that promotes efficiency. Yet, in
contemporary metropolitan areas, a critical local land use policy – exclusionary zoning – operates to
increase the cost of mobility if not frustrate it outright for the many people denied the opportunity
to move into a place because they cannot afford the higher housing costs produced by local
regulation. These people may be able to move, but because of local regulations they must pay more
or move to locations other than those they would have chosen. Metropolitan area exclusionary zoning
flows from the logic of local fiscal autonomy, but it constrains the mobility that is at the heart of the
efficiency case for localism.
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Finally, the enormous disparities in tax bases and spending among localities in a metropolitan
area69 call into question the role of localism in promoting “consumer choice.”70 The efficiency
argument for local autonomy assumes that the tax, service, and regulatory differences among
localities are the result of variations in “tastes.” In theory, the people of one locality might prefer a
municipal swimming pool, another might favor a golf course, a third might opt for higher teacher
salaries, and a fourth might decide to lower taxes and spend less across the board. In fact, however,
local taxing and spending decisions are often based not on idiosyncratic local tastes but on the stark
differences in local fiscal capacity that divide localities within a metropolitan area. Moreover, much
of the difference in local tax bases is due to the location of commercial and industrial activity, to
historic settlement decisions, to the location of highways and natural resources, or to concentrations
of the poor rather than to local government efficiency. Even a leaner, more effective government is
likely to be incapable of offsetting the disadvantages of poor location, aged infrastructure, or a large,
impoverished population. Residents of these poorer locations will have fewer choices, not more, as
a result of local fiscal autonomy.
Thus, in metropolitan areas, a purely localist governance structure will fail to provide some
of the critical elements of the efficiency model, such as the avoidance of spillovers, the freedom of
people to choose their area of residence, and the ability of local governments to respond to the desires
of their residents for quality public services. Some regional policies or structures will be needed to
deal with the external effects of local actions, to constrain local regulations that impede mobility, and
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to assure a level playing field among localities of unequal taxable wealth. In metropolitan areas,
externalities can be avoided, mobility protected, and the opportunity of poorer localities to make
choices among public services secured only at the regional level. In the metropolitan context, then,
the efficiency arguments for localism actually indicate the need for some kind of regionalism.
The efficiency concerns suggest the desirability of a combination of localist and regionalist
policies or structures. Some localist actions will generate few externalities. Not all localities engage
in exclusionary regulation, and not all restrictions on land use are fiscally determined. Some local
control over tax levels and service decisions would be necessary if localities are to accommodate the
differences in preferences that no doubt exist across sprawling metropolitan areas. The efficiency
argument suggests the need for regional policies or structures that can develop norms or guidelines
for local decisions; review and veto local decisions that impose unacceptable costs on neighboring
localities or on the region as whole, or at least provide a mechanism for obtaining the consent of and
providing compensation to those who are adversely affected by local decisions; and provide poorer
localities with a share of regional resources so that a broader range of localities will have the fiscal
capacity to provide the services their residents want. Yet, these policies or structures could leave
many of the basic decisions regarding land uses, housing, economic development, tax rates, or public
service spending to local governments in the first instance. Regionalism need not wholly displace
localism, but the efficiency argument for localism suggests the desirability for some form of
regionalism to assure that in metropolitan settings local policies actually promote efficiency.
2. Democracy
One central value of democracy is that it enables the people affected by government decisions
to participate in the processes by which those decisions are made. Democracy assumes a considerable
24

degree of political equality, that is, of the equal right of those affected by a government’s action to
participate and be heard. A local government that permitted only some of its residents to participate
in local politics or that gave greater weight to the participation of some over others would fail the
basic standard of political equality.71 The pervasive externalities that undermine the efficiency case
for localism, however, mean that many people affected by a local government’s action live outside
the locality’s borders. Local government land use decisions, in particular, regularly affect people
outside local borders who are unable to participate in that decision-making process. Exclusionary
zoning or local regulations that keep out locally undesirable but regionally necessary facilities
frequently affect nonresidents of the acting locality. When localities compete for commercial and
industrial taxpayers, local decisions to offer tax breaks or new, subsidized infrastructure to attract
these desirable potential residents can have negative effects on residents of other areas who have no
right or opportunity to participate in the local decision-making process. The extralocal consequences
of local decisions, thus, not only cause inefficiency; they undermine the assumption that local actions
are democratic.
A second assumption in the democratic case for localism is that local autonomy promotes the
sense of citizen effectiveness, that is, that the decentralization of power creates units small enough
for the individual to have an impact. In the metropolitan area, however, this argument is undermined
by the more limited ability of many local governments to effectively address critical issues of local
significance. Local issues like sprawl, the adequacy of local tax bases to local service needs, and
economic development may not be capable of successful resolution at the local level. The individual
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may have a larger role in the formulation of local policies, but in the metropolitan context purely local
decisions may be powerless to solve many critical problems.
Thus, as with efficiency, the democracy argument actually supports the case for some form
of regionalism. In metropolitan areas, democracy requires giving the regional electorate a voice in
local decisions that have regional consequences. Only by widening the scale of participation to include
all those affected by local actions can local decision-making in metropolitan regions be made truly
democratic. Similarly, action on a regional scale may be necessary to address effectively social,
economic, or environmental problems that are regional in scope, and, thus, to make political
participation seem worthwhile.
Again, the democracy argument suggests the value of a combination of localist and regionalist
policies and institutions rather either a totally fragmented localist system or the consolidation of all
local government decision-making at the regional level. As not all local decisions have extralocal
consequences, local governments should have power to address purely local matters. Even for
regional matters, local decision-making can play an important role in adapting regional norms to
different local settings, and local institutions can provide a critical framework for the development
of views about regional matters. Regionalism does create a problem of scale. The sheer size of many
metropolitan regions will make it difficult for residents to participate at the regional level. Local
institutions can provide residents with a critical forum for the initial discussion of regional problems
and a setting for political organization to deal with regional decisions. Democracy requires both
grass-roots participation and accountability to the regional electorate interested in and affected by
local actions.
An ongoing dialogue between the local and the regional will be necessary to advance the value
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of democratic participation in public decision-making in metropolitan areas. But given the current
entrenchment of local decision-making and the virtual absence of regional policy-making, the
significance of the democratic argument for localism in the metropolitan context is that it plainly calls
for the creation of some regional processes, structures, or institutions so that the voice of the
regional electorate can be heard.
3. Community
The argument from community assumes that localities are not simply the land and people
contained by artificial lines on a map, but are, instead place-based associations of people who closely
interact with each other, have common interests and concerns, and are in some sense bound to each
other. In many major metropolitan areas, however, localities are not communities within the
traditional sense of the term. They are not the focal points for most of the activities of their residents
– the place where residence, business, friendship, family, and social activities converge. Rather,
residents typically live, work, shop, and go to school in different localities. Most metropolitan
localities lack their own distinctive local economies72 and town centers,73 much as their residents lack
“geographic rootedness”74 and the sense of shared history and tradition that are part of the notion of
community. Only the metropolitan area includes most of the daily activities and social and economic
concerns of the residents of a metropolitan area.
Of course, the metropolitan area is hardly a community in the romantic sense of a group of
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people who feel closely bonded to each other. The enormous territorial scale of the metropolitan
region and the heterogeneity of the metropolitan population make the frequent, close interactions and
the shared values necessary for the sense of community difficult to achieve. Metropolitan area
residents may be economically interdependent and have common interests in such matters as the
regional infrastructure, environment, and economy but this is often not enough to create the sense
of shared fate associated with the notion of community. Neither the locality nor the metropolitan area
may be a true community in the strong sense of the term.
To a considerable extent, the existing localist structure makes a recognition of the
metropolitan community more difficult. By tying political participation, services, taxes, and land use
regulation to existing local governments, localism makes localities the focus of their residents’
loyalties, concerns and identities. With local borders narrowing their range of vision, residents of one
locality may not recognize that they are affected by the actions of other local governments or have
a stake in the well-being of residents of other localities in the metropolitan area. Instead, local
boundaries limit the scope of residents’ concerns and create a psychological separation among
metropolitan area localities that is far more difficult to bridge than physical distance alone. The
existing localist structure promotes interlocal conflict and exacerbates divisions within the
metropolitan area, thereby making it more difficult for metropolitan regions to recognize their areas
of shared interest and interdependence.
The argument from community does not provide unambiguous support for regionalism. To
be sure, the weaker sense of community within localities in a metropolitan area weakens the
communitarian case for localism. Moreover, the extent of regular interactions across the metropolitan
area, the shared environment, and the tentative evidence of economic interdependence, all suggest
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that, objectively speaking, the metropolitan area forms a kind of community which needs legal
recognition so that it may act on its own behalf to address its problems. Yet, most metropolitan areas
seem to lack the subjective sense of community – the “empathy and commitment to the common
good”75 that make people feel they are part of a community.
Perhaps the real connection between community and regionalism is not that a metropolitan
region is a community and therefore ought to have regional policies and regional governance, but that
some regionalist policy-making and governance is necessary to create the sense of regional
community which is necessary to address regional problems. Metropolitan regions will require a sense
of metropolitan community if they are to tackle questions of regional land use regulation, the
protection of the regional environment, the availability of affordable housing, the spatial concentration
of poverty and its consequences, and interlocal fiscal and service inequalities. Regional growth
management laws, regional tax-base sharing, or regional governing councils would be not simply a
means of allowing the regional community to control its collective fate, but also a means of bringing
the regional community into being.
4. Equality
Equality is not an argument for localism, but a concern about locality drives much of the
argument that regionalism is really an extension of localism for metropolitan areas. The central
failings of localism in metropolitan areas are that its efficiency and democracy benefits are not equally
available to all metropolitan area residents, and that, as a result, it treats the residents of poorer
localities as less than equal members of the metropolitan community.
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The existing localist structure reflects and reinforces economic and social inequalities.76 As
previously noted, at the heart of the Tiebout model is mobility. It is the ability to relocate from one
place to another within the metropolitan area that is said to enhance “consumer choice,” to promote
competition, and to protect local residents from their governments. But mobility is not equally
available to all local residents. Interlocal movement can be costly. There are the out-of-pocket costs
of searching for a new place to live, and of picking up and moving oneself and one’s family. There
are the psychic costs of uprooting oneself from a neighborhood and leaving friends, family and
neighbors behind. Moreover, most people can reside only where they have access to work. Thus,
corporate investment decisions, local zoning regulations, and transportation policies that determine
the location of jobs, roads, and the costs of commuting from home to workplace all affect ease of
movement. Poorer, less educated potential movers will have fewer options and will be forced to bear
more costs if they attempt to move. Similarly, people can reside only where they can afford to reside.
For many potential movers, exclusionary zoning sharply limits the range of residential choices.
Mobility is not equally available to all members of the metropolitan area. In general
corporations are more mobile than people. Affluent people are more mobile than poor people. People
without children may be more mobile than families with children. Moreover, localities tend to deploy
their powers -- land use regulation, taxing, and spending -- to recruit the more mobile groups that are
also likely to make a greater contribution to the local tax base than they cost in local services. As a
result, the benefits of the localist system are unequally available to members of the metropolitan area,
with corporations and the affluent more likely to benefit than everyone else.
The localist system gives enormous significance to the differences in local tax bases and the
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spatial location of local problems. With property wealth and service needs unevenly distributed
throughout the region and greater property wealth per household generally concentrated in areas of
lower need, there are profound interlocal taxing and spending inequalities. More affluent localities
do very well under this system, but poorer localities do not. The localities whose people are in
greatest need are simply unable to meet the needs of their residents or to compete for the tax base
that would enhance their fiscal capacity. Some forms of regionalism – such as regional fair share
housing requirements77 or regional tax base sharing78 – are necessary simply to assure the more equal
treatment of people and localities within the metropolitan region. Only by giving the region some
form of legal and political existence can people act below the state and national level to attend to the
education, public safety, housing, and employment needs of residents throughout a metropolitan area.

III. The Prospects for Regionalism
Although the values that support localism, and the concern that the benefits of localism ought
to be equally available in local governments throughout the metropolitan area, provide a theoretical
support for regionalism, in practice localism and regionalism tend to be in conflict.
Localism is deeply entrenched in our legal and political system, and, despite the steady growth of
metropolitan areas as economic, social, and ecological units, regionalism has made relatively little
headway in the policies and governance that affect metropolitan areas. New arguments for
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regionalism are being developed, new alliances have been formed, and regionalist initiatives have met
some successes in places like Portland, Oregon, and the Twin Cities, but in most areas regional
policies concerning such crucial questions as growth management, exclusionary zoning and tax base
equity are missing, and regional governance structures – other than those related to physical
infrastructure – are absent. Some places may even be stepping back from the limited regionalism they
practice, as New York State’s abrupt, recent elimination of New York City’s commuter income tax
suggests.79
Although arguments from efficiency, democracy and community provide the rhetoric for
contemporary localists, the resistance to regionalism in the political process is largely a matter of the
self-interest of those who benefit from the status quo, such as local elected officials,80 land
developers,81 corporations that are the subjects of interlocal bidding, and the businesses and residents
located in the high-tax base localities of the metropolitan area. Localism in practice is often less about
efficiency, democracy, or community than about preserving existing political powers over local
resources, protecting residents of high-wealth localities from the needs of their lower-wealth
neighbors, and providing opportunities for businesses to take advantage of the interlocal competition
for tax base.
Indeed, in apparent response to the self-interest that drives localism, contemporary
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regionalists have come to give greater weight to arguments from self-interest as well.82 The argument
from global economic competitiveness is really an attempt to persuade regional residents, and
especially the businesses and residents located in high-income areas, that they, too, would benefit
from a more regionalist structure and that it is in their self-interest to help poorer localities within the
region, especially the central city, to address their problems. A different, more confrontational,
argument from self-interest has been developed by Myron Orfield. He has sought to persuade the
residents of older declining suburbs, who traditionally have resisted regionalism and have looked to
localism as a means of preserving their political distance from the central cities, that regionalism,
particular regional fair-share housing regulation and regional tax-base sharing is in the self-interest
of those communities.83
The central role of self-interest in the determination of whether metropolitan areas will have
a localist or more regional shape is certainly not surprising, nor is it necessarily distressing. It is
reasonable for people to make decisions concerning public policy and government structure by trying
to determine the likely impact of those decisions on their interests. Nor is it uniquely American, as
Professor Petersen’s analysis in this Symposium of the long and difficult effort to create a relatively
modest form of regional planning in the Toronto metropolitan area demonstrates.84 It does, however,
make it difficult to assess the prospects for regionalism.
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As the uncertainty over the extent of intraregional interdependency indicates, it is simply
unclear whether the localities within a region rise and fall together. Despite the studies that have
found evidence of city-suburb linkages, it is far from certain whether the future economic successes
of the more affluent localities in the region – what Orfield calls the “favored quarter”85 – require that
they help address the social and economic problems of areas of concentrated poverty within the
region.86
Nor is self-interest entirely a matter of objective data concerning income levels and
employment rates. Central city officials and residents who might benefit from some forms of
regionalism, like tax base sharing, might be leery of regional initiatives that seem to threaten the
autonomy of their communities or weaken their political voices.87 This is particularly likely where the
central city has a black or Hispanic majority but the regional majority is white.88 Regional
development initiatives, regional growth controls, and regional fiscal equalization may improve the
overall economic well-being of a metropolitan area but that argument is likely to have purchase with
metropolitan area residents only if they themselves as part of a metropolitan area, with concerns in
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common with residents of other areas in the region, and not simply as members of their own local
units. Older suburbs that might benefit from tax base sharing or regional growth management may
still be reluctant to cede to a regional authority their power over land development89 or to link
themselves politically with the central cities.90 In order for these older suburbs to become regionalists
their residents must cease viewing the central cities as fiscal drains on suburban resources and must
begin to perceive that what unites them to the central cities is more important than what divides
them.91 Such perceptions of regional self-interest are not impossible. Developments in places like
metropolitan Portland, Oregon, metropolitan Seattle, and the Twin Cities metropolitan area suggest
that it is possible to think in terms of a regional self -- of a regional community. But those examples
are relatively rare in American metropolitan areas.
The real challenge for regionalism as we enter the 21st century, then, is not the theoretical
arguments for localism. Those, as I have suggested, actually tend to cut in favor of regionalism and
not against it in our metropolitan areas. Rather, the fate of regionalism will turn on whether
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regionalists will be able to persuade people that their interests are sufficiently tied up with those of
the residents or other communities within the region. The political and legal movement from localism
to regionalism will occur only when people believe that they are part of a region as well as part of a
locality, and that their interests will be advanced by supplementing local governance with regional
policies and political structures that give effect to those interests and promote the well-being of the
region as a whole and of all the localities within it.
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